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OH TEE MICRO-ECONOMICS OF TECHNICAL PROGRESS 
This paper surveys some recent developments ia the theory of the 
1 
economies of technological change» 
Although I have written the survey with the questions of how tech-
nological change gets transfered from developed to the less developed 
countries, how it diffuses within the Idc's, and how it gets adapted 
there to local conditions clearly in mind, X have not surveyed the 
liter©tux® which directly addresses those questions; it is ay belief, 
however, that the insights which can be obtained from this more general 
discussion of the nature of technological change will have considerable 
bearing on those questions, as I hope my discussion will make evident* 
I have divided this survey into two parts. In the first, X discuss 
the basic "underpinnings" of the theory of technological change, what X 
call the microamicro=econoraics of technological change: what is techno-
logical change, how is it produced, how is its production similar and 
dissimilar from other economic activities? Xn the second section, X 
1 
Much of the literature which X survey is unpublished, some of 
it is unwritten« Xn this draft, because of lack of time, X have been 
less than thorough in making a complete survey of the literature. This 
paper should rather be viewed as the conceptual outlines of the Theory 
of Technical Progress. 
discuss the micro-economics of technological changei within the past 
few years, the traditional questipns of the relationship between market 
structure and technological change has been re-examined« This has, I 
think, produced a significantly different view of the relationship, a 
reformulation which has, I think, some fundamental implications for 
both patent, anti-trust and protectionist policies« 
2 
I. ON THE NATURE OF TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS 
-2.1« Alternative Views of R&D 
In Solow's famous 1957 paper, over J3% of the growth in the United 
States over the past 50 years was attributed to technological change.. 
Clearly, if that were the case, an understanding of the nature of tech-
nological progress is required for an understanding of the processes of 
economic growth. Three views of what technological change was developed 
in the subsequent years: 
2 . 1 . 1 The Residual Approach 
The first view was an essentially negative one: technological 
change was what one called a change in the production function which 
one could not explain in some other way; it was, in other words, a 
"residual«" Thus, to "understand" technological progress meant "to 
explain it away." The attempt, to do so became a favorite past time 
of both clever econometricians and skilled number crunchers. Part of 
the residual could be attributed to improved education, part of the 
residual could be eliminated if one "adjusted" the price of capital 
goods correctly, part of it was related to scale economies, part of 
it was due to shorter working hours, etc. So successful was this 
quest for "explaining technological change by explaining it away" 
that Griliches and Jorgenson did precisely that: in their formulation 
there was essentially no residual. 
This result did not, I think, convince anyone that technological 
change had not occurred in the United States over the past one hundred 
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years. What it did do, however, was to suggest that the residual 
approach to quantifying technological change was not likely to shed 
much light on the question of the importance of technological change, 
let along on the processes by which it occurred. 
2.1.2 R&D As An Investment 
The second view of technological progress also developed out of 
the concern for understanding the interaction of technological change 
and growth: it observed that expenditures on R&D were like an invest-
ment, the returns to these expenditures occurring over extended periods 
into the future. Economies were viewed as having a choice between 
investing in machines and investing in R&D. In analyzing this choice, 
capital goods and R&D were modelled in almost the same manner; the only 
critical difference was that the production function did not exhibit 
diminishing returns to knowledge in the same way that it did to capital. 
More formally, the aggregate production function was usually written in 
the form 
(1) Q = AF(K,L) 
where Q is output 
A is the state of technology 
K is the capital stock 
L is the labor force. 
Thus doubling A doubled output for all values of K and L; while doubling 
K, for a given value of A and L, would less than double output. 
This simple observation has some very important implications. For 
most of traditional economic analysis (e.g. the viability of competitive 
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equilibrium) requires diminishing returns to all "factors". If knowledge 
is like a "factor of production" then we have to inquire how can it be 
produced and supplied? Clearly, traditional models of the supply of 
factors will be inapplicable. These questions, implicit (or perhaps 
explicit) in this literature were not (until recently) pursued. 
2.1.3 R&D As A Public Good 
The third view observed that technological change was like a 
public good: giving one person a piece of knowledge did not detract 
» 
from the one amount of knowledge that others had. In this sense, it 
seemed like a rare case of a pure public good. But it was a public 
good the returns to which could be appropriated with patents. It was 
obviously not socially desirable to do so, since to do so would restrict 
output (since there was no marginal social cost to using the knowledge); 
but if R&D had to be produced in the private sector, then there was an 
optimal patent, balancing the incentives which a patent provided for 
o 
doing research and the returns resulting from the research, on the one 
hand, against the losses associated with the restriction in output. 
2.1.4 R&D As Information 
The view which has been developed in the last few years is closely 
related to the two preceding views: it is that R&D is like "information" 
or perhaps more precisely, it is a kind of information. Expenditures on 
information are often investments; the returns to information increase 
with the scale of production; and information is a public good. Viewing 
technological change as information does, however, give us considerable 
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further insight into the nature of technological progress. For it pro-
vides us some further insights into the nature of the processes by which 
technological change is acquired, and the manner and extent to which the 
return can be appropriated. 
2.2 Differences Between R&D and Other Economic Activities 
The production of knowledge is different from the production of 
ordinary goods in several important ways. 
a) Knowledge is often produced as a by-product of other economic 
activities, in a way which is inseparable from those activi-
ties. The classic formulation of this is what is referred 
to as "learning by doing", the process of production leads 
to improved efficiency in doing whatever is being done. But 
there are other important examples as well: the fact that 
a firm succeeds in producing something conveys what in many 
cases turns out to be an extremely valuable piece of informa-
o 
tion: that the thing which the firm is producing can be pro-
duced. (The knowledge that synthetic fibers can be produced 
in an economicly viable manner has a significant effect on 
the expected returns to searching for a synthetic fiber, and 
thus on the allocation of resources to the discovery of other 
synthetic fibers.) 
b) The analogy to information has, in fact, also proved useful 
in generating a better understanding of the "micro-micro" 
structure of research. There has been some interesting work 
modeling the problem of research as a "search problem". This 
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allows a detailed analysis of the equilibrium "search strategy" 
compared to the optimal search strategy. Such comparison 
underlie some of the analysis of section 2„4«3 where we suggest 
for instance that the market undertakes excessively risky 
research strategies» 
c) There is a general theorem which shows that the production of 
information is, in general, subject to increasing returns to 
scales regardless of the parameterization of information it 
never pays a Bayesian to undertake a little bit of research. 
t 
This means that if it is worth conducting research, it ought 
to be conducted at a scale no smaller than some strictly posi-
tive level. It also means that there will be specialization 
of research strategies, rather than the comple diversification 
which would predominate if there were imperfectly correlated 
risks with no increasing returns « 
d) Since every piece of information produced must be different from 
any other piece of information produced (otherwise it is not new 
"knowledge"), there is a fundamental sense in which there cannot 
exist competitive markets for information (knowledge). This can 
be put another way? since before being told the "piece of infor-
mation" the buyer cannot know what the seller is selling, and 
since after being told precisely what it is that the seller has 
to sell, the buyer has no reason to pay the seller for it (since 
it has, by then, already received it), markets for information 
cannot work. (This is obviously an extreme way of putting the 
matter: in practice, the seller gives some indications to the 
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buyer of what he has to sell, but does not provide all the 
details; the point is that markets for information are, 
inherently, imperfect.)^ 
(e) There is another related characteristic of the production 
of knowledge which it shares with some other commodities 
but which is of critical importance here: the activity of 
research and development is inherently extremely risky, 
but the risk are uninsurable; it is virtually impossible 
to ascertain whether the inventor failed to discover the 
invention because the invention was not feasible, or because 
he did not work hard enough, or because he was an incompetent 
investigator. Insurance markets are likely to be non-existent 
or highly imperfect whenever there is a large potential for 
asymmetric information (the buyer of the insurance knows more 
about the likelihood of success than does the seller) and 
when the actions of the buyer affect the outcomes, and are 
difficult if not impossible to observe. Both of these con-
ditions are satisfied here. Moreover, unlike other forms 
of investment, there is no collateral, so that the costs of 
failure to a lender are likely to be greater than for ordinary 
investment opportunities. The consequence of these observa-
tions is that inventors are likely to require self-financing; 
1 
The arguments of the preceding paragraph would lead to the con-
clusion that there would never exist a market for information. Some infor-
mation is, however, purchased. The seller establishes a reputation for the 
quality of information he sells. Salop and Stiglitz have recently analyzed 
the nature of markets with imperfect information but repeat sales. 
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many of the earlier discussions of innovation and industrial 
concentration emphasized this point (although without much 
detail as to the economic explanation of why the appropriate 
insurance and capital markets would not exist); but the impor-
tance of this for modern industrialized economies is moot; all 
that is required is that the firm have enough physical capital 
to serve as collateral; since funds are fungible, firms can 
borrow for capital investment, but use the proceeds for R&D.^ 
2.3» The Problem of Appropriability 
We noted earlier that knowledge (information) is a pure public 
good, in the sense that giving knowledge to another individual does not 
detract from that which the others has. But unlike some public goods, 
in many cases the returns to invention are appropriable. However, the 
degree of appropriability will differ for different kinds of information 
(invention), and this will affect the pattern and direction of the allo-
cation of resources to R&D and innovation. 
Traditional discussions of appropriability have focused on the 
use of the patent system. (We mentioned earlier, for instance, the 
trade off between the incentives for research provided by R&D and the 
restriction in output which results from a patent system.) But it is 
now becoming widely recognized that the patent system is relevant for 
1 
Since the amount of R&D affects the riskiness of all loans 
outstanding to the firm, the implicit cost of expenditures on R&D are 
likely to be greater than the cost of capital used for other kinds of 
investment. The relationship between the private cost of capital and 
the social cost for R&D expenditures requires further investigation. 
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only a small fraction of inventions and innovations.. One reason for 
this is that the very process of patenting conveys important informa-
tion to competitors: the design specifications which are required 
to be submitted in conjunction with a patent application provide the 
basis for the competitors to "invent" around the patent. Firms may be 
able to increase their profits by attempting to keep the design speci-
fications secret. 
A second reason is that many important innovations are not really 
patentable. The improvement in the technology of selling hamburgers 
provided by McDonald's was evidently of enormous value (measured by the 
profitability of the enterprise), yet this technological innovation was 
not patentable. 
Indeed, almost all research, whether successful or not success-
ful, contributes to the common pool of knowledge, by providing other 
researchers with information about where to look and where not to look 
for discoveries. The returns to this information cannot be appropri-
ated, or can only be partially appropriated. 
The fact that private firms do engage in research, most of which 
is unpatentable, suggests that there are other methods of reaping returns. 
The basic method of obtaining returns is closely related to the property 
of increasing returns that we noted earlier: significant discoveries 
(leading to significant lowering of costs or to a new product) give 
firms some degree of monopoly power; this is temporary—others may enter 
the market, and bid away their monopoly profits--but until this occurs, 
the firm earns some monopoly profits. The knowledge is not sold; it is 
goods which are sold; but the nature of market in which the goods are 
sold is affected by the production of knowledge. 
The fact that the returns to R&D are related to the size of the 
1 
firm means that R&D is likely to lead to industrial concentration« 
But there is a limit on the degree to which firms may exercise the 
monopoly power which may be associated with any degree of concentration: 
for in the absence of direct restraints on trade, threat of entry will 
limit the extent to which, even in a highly concentrated market, the 2 
largest firm can act like a monopolist» We shall return to this ques-
tion in section 3» 
There are other methods of reaping returns to innovation. In some 
cases, the knowledge of a discovery provides the firm (inventor) with 
"prior" or "inside" knowledge, which allows him to profitably speculate 
on the change of price of some commodity or firm (Hirschliefer, for 
instance, suggests that Eli Whitney could have made a killing on the 
cotton market; but to appropriate even a small fraction of the returns 
requires that there exists markets extending at least several years into 
the future). 
In many cases, the researcher can charge for the transmission of 
knowledge, and appropriate rents associated with the transmission. 
The management fees associated with introducing new technologies 
can be interpreted as a method of appropriating returns on R&D. 
-j 
That is, if a process invention which cannot be patented 
reduced the cost of a firm by $x per unit, the total value of that 
invention is proportional to the number of units produced by the 
firm; and this fact means that the allocation of resources to R&D 
will be greater the larger the firm. 
2 
The fact that he cannot act like an unbridled monopolist does 
not mean that he acts competitively. The threat of entry, as we shall 
argue below, affects actions other than price determination. 
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Although there are several methods of appropriating returns, it 
should be emphasized that the returns received are not directly related 
to the marginal social value of the research. On the one hand, (a) 
there are frequently spillovers of the knowledge gleaned in one area 
to another; and (b) whenever a product invention occurs, there is some 
consumer surplus associated with it. Unless firms are perfectly dis-
criminating monopolies, they do not capture this surplus in its entirety. 
Much of the literature has focused on this partial appropriability of 
the returns, with the implied underinvestment in R&D which results. 
But there are several other effects which makes the nature of the 
bias more ambiguous. Three of these we have already noted: the rents 
associated with transmission are not necessarily equal to the marginal 
costs of production and transmission of knowledge (but cure obviously 
less than the value of the piece of knowledge); the capital gains as-
sociated with the change in prices, and the returns which can thereby 
obtained, may be greater or less than the social value of the piece of 
information; and the monopoly power associated with large changes in the 
costs of production yields monopoly rents which are not directly related 
to the value of the invention (although again, these must be less than 
the total value of the invention, although not necessarily less than the 
marginal value). 
There are two other effects, however, which should be noted. 
First, the actual contribution of a particular inventor is the present 
discounted value of having the invention earlier than it otherwise 
would have occurred. But this is not observable. There is a sense 
in which all potential inventors draw upon a common pool of knowledge. 
Much invention consists of transforming basic ideas into marketable 
Commodities, and some of the return, in a system in which basic ideas 
are not patentable, but the produced commodities are, is really a 
return on the basic ideas. Thus, individuals compete to produce 
marketable patentable commodities, to acquire a share in the common 
pool of rentso As in any common pool type of situation, this may lead 
to excessive entry. 
Secondly, in economies with monopolistic competition and product 
differentiation prices in general do not equal marginal costs; the 
introduction of a new way commodity may have consequences for the via™ 
ability of other commodities, e.g. the introduction of a new commodity 
may lead to the withdrawal of others. In this case, the gain in con-
sumer surplus due to the newly invented commodity has to be matched by 
the loss due to the withdrawal of others. The net effect is ambiguous; 
and what the research can appropriate could conceivably exceed the next 
gain to society« 
It is because the degree of appropriability will differ so mar-
kedly among different types of invention that generalizations such as 
"there is too much or too little invention" seem inappropriate? what is 
probably more important is that the differences in the degree of appro» 
priability will affect the direction of R&D; and firms will attempt to 
take actions which increase the degree of appropriability associated 
with any particular innovation. 
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2.4. Biases in the Pattern of R&D and the Characterization of 
Technological Change 
Earlier discussions attempting to characterize technological 
progress focused on the effect that technological progress had on the 
demand for different factors; technological change was characterized 
as being labor saving or capital saving or labor augmenting or capital 
augmenting. Traditional discussions of the relationship between R&D 
in developed and less developed countries has emphasized that techno-
logical progress in developed countries is biased towards saving labor, 
a bias which is inappropriate for l.d.c.'s. Without disagreeing with 
the conclusion of that argument, what I would like to do in this section 
is to point out (a) there are a number of implicit assumptions in the 
traditional argument which seriously limit the force of the argument; and 
(b) there are a number of other characteristics of technological change 
besides the labor biasedness, biases in which may be more important than 
the traditional factor choice bias. 
2.4.1 Remarks on the Factor Bias of Technological Progress 
Older discussions of induced technological progress (e.g. Habakkuk) 
refer to "labor scarcity" as having induced labor saving invention. These 
earlier discussions were subjected to criticism, on the grounds that in 
equilibrium, all factors are scarce. The fact that wages are rising sug-
gests that labor is becoming more scarce, and might lead to an argument 
that, if technological change is related to factor scarcity, that it might 
become more labor saving than it had been previously. But the mere fact 
that wages are higher than they were at some arbitrary date in the past is 
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not a reason for arguing that firms should attempt to economize on labor ; 
th©y ahould attempt, to economize on all factors. 
To make sense out of an argument for factor bias, one must intro-
duce a £M; it turns out more convenient to phrase our analysis 
in terras of labor or capital augment.ng technological change, but the 
conversion to labor or capital saving (in the Hicksian terminology) is 
straightforward. We thus postulate for that for some industry 
2 ° F( )j. K, X L )» 
output is a function of the capital and labor inputs (we could add addi-
tional t®nas for the inputs of raw materials); and of the efficiency with 
which those are utilised, which is summarized by ¡j, and X . 
iJe postulate that, for a given expenditure on R&D, the firm has 
a choie® of various possible values which u ^ j an<^ 1 
can take next period, as depicted in Figure 1. 
We write 
u = u U ) 
We have drawn the function to be concave, but we make no argument for 
that shape. 
For any given input, it wishes to maximize its output next period 
i.e. 
m a x F( ia ( X) K, X L) 
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so 
F 1 M X K + F 2 L = 0 
or 
F 2 = g 
F j u K 1 - a u 
where a - share of labor 
In a competitive economy, the elasticity of the invention possibilities 
schedule must be equal to the relative share of labor divided by the 
relative share of capital. 
More generally, we can write the cost of production facing any 
firm as 
C = C ( w/X , r/u ) 
where w = ^ e c o s t labor 
r = the cost of capital. 
Thus cost minimization, for competitive or non-competitive f i rms, is 
given by 
1 + 2 .. = 0 
2 T 2 a \ 
\ LL 
But 
C1 = \ L, C2 = uK 
Hence we obtain 
X _ wL 
Li rK 1 -
- 1 6 -
We thus immediately obtain the result that if in two economies, 
the relative shares are the same (even if factor suppies are markedly 
different), if they face the same invention possibilities schedule, 
then they would have the same factor bias in technological progress» 
This would suggest that technological change would be somewhat 
less labor augmenting, were the l.doc.'s to determine its direction, 
than it is at present, but perhaps not dramatically so. 
A natural retort by those who believe that technological change 
in lod.c.'s should be much less labor augmenting is that factor prices 
in l.d.c.'s do not correctly reflect true factor scarcities? that labor 
is in surplus, so that the appropriate <2 to use from a social view is 
"0™» The recognition that market prices and shadow prices may differ 
has played an important role in cost benefit analysis of projects, and 
should certainly not be ignored is this context» At the same time, it 
is important not to confuse the existence of unemployment with a zero 
shadow price» As Harberger and Stiglitz have shown in 
models in which there is rural-urban migration, the shadow price on 
labor is approximately the urban wage, if the rural wage is relatively 
unaffected by the out •= migration. 
There is another sense in which shadow prices for labor, partic-
ularly for skilled labor, may differ from market prices, which is espe-
cially relevant in situations where markets are thin. Assume that a 
particular machine requires labor with particular characteristics. Each 
machine requires one unit of labor. Then, when that laborer leaves, the 
machine will be unemployed until a new laborer is hired. The firm can 
either keep a stock of reserve capacity of workers available, or it can 
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let the machine remain unemployed until the worker is replaced. It can 
attempt to induce more workers to apply (in order to obtain, from the 
applicant pool, someone with the desired characteristics) so that the 
length of time that the machine is unemployed is reduced. In any of 
these cases, the cost of labor (relative to the cost of capital) is 
greater than a simple calculation using the wage rate of those actually 
working on the machine would suggest. In particular, if skilled labor 
markets are thin, as they are in many l.d.c.'s, the fact that there is 
unemployment of general labor (or even skilled labor in general, but 
not of labor with the particular skills required by the firm in ques-
tion) does not mean that the shadow wages are not equal to or greater 
than market wages« 
The traditional factor bias argument needs to be qualified in 
two other directions: 
a) In the traditional analysis, as in our presentation above, 
firms developing the new techniques took a completely myopic 
view. On the one hand, if they recognize that the machines 
and technologies which they are presently developing for the 
developed countries, will eventually become utilized by the 
less developed economies, then with suitable appropriability 
assumptions, they will take that into account in determing 
the direction of factor bias. 
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This makes particular sense for those multinational companies 
who regularly export technology to the Ld.Co's> 
Kote that if this argument is correct, then if the speed of 
diffusion of new technology to the Ld.c.'s is increased, 
then the l»doC.'s may benefit, not only as a result of the 
improved technology, but also as a result of the new technol-
ogy which is being exported being more appropriate for the 
lodoC O ' So 
On the other hand, if the differences in factor shares between 
the developed and less developed countries are expected to 
increase in the future, and if firms in the developed countries 
take a non-myopic, view in their choice of, direction of factor 
bias in technological change, then the magnitude of the bias 
in the direction of technological change may be even greater 
than we have postulated above» 
b) In the traditional analysis, no attention is paid to the nature 
of the returns to scale, either in the production or utilization 
of R&D o 
2o4o2 Other Biases in the Direction of R&D 
There are two categories of choices with respect to R&D strategy 
that have to be separated: those that affect how research is conducted 
and those which affect the objective of the research program» The pre-
ceding discussion concerned one dimension of the latter» Several other 
dimensions need to be mentioned: 
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a) R&D and the optimal scale of production. In maAy industries, 
technology is best described by a U-shaped cost curve. 
Changes in technology affect the entire shape of the cost 
curve, and in particular, they effect the scale of output 
corresponding to minimum average cost. This, for instance, 
is particularly true of the chemical industry, where better 
plants almost always have larger capacities. We can envisage 
a trade-off between reductions in the fixed costs associated 
with any plant, reductions in the variable cost, and increases 
in the maximum feasible output from any plant, as depicted in 
Figure 2. 
Our concern here is how the choice among these potential 
directions of technical change in the market might differ 
from the socially optimal direction, and how it might differ 
between developed countries and l.d.c.'s. If markets are 
imperfectly competitive, then' firms may, by increasing the 
optimal scale at which production occurs, effectively reduce 
competition and deter entry. There would seem to be a bias 
in favor of excessive scale. Since markets in l.d.c.'s for 
non-exported goods are smaller than corresponding markets in 
developed economies, the ensueing degree of monopoly within 
the l.d.c. may be even larger and the distortion in the 
direction of R&D even more costly. 
b) Imitability. Some inventions or innovations can easily be 
imitated, even with a patent system; others may not be. Firms 
make profits over the interval of time during which they can 
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exercise monopoly power in the market; if they can exercise 
this power for a long time, there will be a greater incentive 
for R&D. 
c) Consumer communicability« For product inventions, consumers 
have to be informed of the new invention and of its character-
istics« For some commodities, this information may be con-
veyed easily and cheaply, say by distributing samples« But 
for durable goods, this is not a feasible method of conveying 
information« In that case, there is a bias in the direction 
of technical progress towards those commodities with character-
istics which can be readily and easily communicated« 
d) Present state of competition. In some commodities, there is 
close competition, while in others, there may be relatively 
few firms. In areas with heavy competition, the returns to 
a new invention are likely to be bid away quickly. 
There is an important interaction between (b), (c) and (d): Firms 
are likely to direct their research to commodities in which ther is rela-
tively little competition, and in which they can quickly establish a large 
market share before imitation occurs. It should be apparent that this 
particular pattern of innovation may not bear a close correspondence to 
the socially optimal pattern. 
e) Localization of technical progress and spillovers. Many changes 
in technique have implications for a number of different production 
processes« For instance, a better conveyor belt affects a vast 
array of production processes. Other changes in technique are 
very particular; they have very little spillovers. 
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This is sometimes depicted, as in Figure 4, in terms of the 
effect of technical change on the isoquant. Some technical 
improvements move the entire isoquant down; others shift 
only a point. The latter type of technical progress is some-
times referred to as localized technical progress (Atkinson 
and Stiglitz). 
There may be some choice about the degree of localization of 
technical progress; that is, there may be a trade off between 
looking for an invention that shifts the isoquant from its 
present state to the new isoquant A or the new isoquant B. 
This choice is affected by a number of considerations. First, 
if the firm knows precisely the factor prices it faces, it is 
clear that A is preferable to B. On the other hand, if it is 
uncertain about its factor prices, B may be preferable. B has, 
in a sense, greater flexibility. Secondly, localization may 
make the invention less imitable, and thus make it easier for 
the firm to appropriate the returns. In particular, the firm 
will attempt to localize the technical progress in directions 
\ 
which are related to the peculiar' situation which it finds 
itself in. There is a sense, then, in which firms, more than 
simply ignoring spillovers, may attempt to minimize them. 
Clearly, the degree of localization has an important bearing 
on the extent to which l.d.c.'s benefit from improvements in 
technology in the developed economies. 
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W® have focused, in the preceding paragraphs, on localization 
with respect to factor bias (the choice of technique of produc-
tion). But there are other choices, e.g. improvements which 
sight affect the quality of a wide range of products or only 
of a subset of commodities, for which the concept of "local" 
ization® is applicableo 
In the preceding discussion, we presented a number of char-
acteristics of commodities, which affect the return to their 
invention and innovation. The return to inventing or devel-
oping a particular commodity may differ between different 
countries or economic environments. For instance, if an 
electric generating firm is connected with a large network 
of other generating firms, the return to reliability may be 
markedly different., than if it is the sole producer; and if it 
is the sole producer, the return to reliability will differ 
markedly depending on whether it has a reserve generating 
.capacity which it keeps on hand or does not. 
2.4.3 Biases in the Pattern of Research 
In this section, we discuss briefly biases associated with the 
manner in which research is conducted. Four potentially significant 
kinds of biases have been identified: 
a) Speed of Research. Since the patent system (as well as the 
method <5f appropriating returns through exercising monopoly 
power), rewards.the first entrant disproprotionately ("winner 
takes all"), there may be a significant bias in encouraging 
excessively fast research. 
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b) Riskiness of Research Strategy. The returns to research are, 
however, extremely stochastic, and what is relevant therefore 
is the probability that one's research strategy pays off before 
one's competitors succeed. Undertaking riskier research strat-
egies may increase the probability of success at an earlier 
date, and may be undertaken even if the expected date at which 
success occurs is thereby postponed. The market, in other 
words, undertakes, from a socially point of view, excessively 
risky research strategies. 
c) Size of Projects. Since the degree of monopoly power increases 
more than in proportion to the reduction in risk (that is, a 
small invention reduces costs, but gives the inventor little 
monopoly power; a large invention may make the firm dominant 
in the industry), there may be a bias for "large" relative to 
small inventions. 
Both of these arguments have to be qualified when account is 
taken of risk aversion on the part of inventors and the exis-
tence of imperfect markets for risks. 
d) Independence of research strategies. Different firms can pur-
sue research strategies the outcomes of which differ in their 
correlation. Arguments have been put forward suggesting that 
the market wij.1 be insufficiently diversified: since what 
firm A cares about is the probability that B succeeds before A, 
if A could undertake ^ perfectly correlated research strategy 
(success of B implies success of A and conversely) but only 
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at a slightly faster speed, he would» This question, however, 
1 has not yet been fully analyzed» 
3.1 Market Structure and Innovation 
It has long been recognized that there are important relations 
between market structure and the technical progress» There has been, 
for instance, considerable controversy over whether monopoly encourages 
invention or innovation or discourages it. 
Many of the simple models (e.g. that of Arrow) which have b©@n 
formulated to empare the two are misleading or at least overly simplo» 
Fig'st, they often assume that the market situation prior to the 
invention os innovation was identical; in fact in different market 
structures, firms will take different actions prior to the invention or 
innovationo For instance, in the case of natural resources, the rate 
of depletion of the natural resource will be diffèrent between compati-
tive and monopolistic markets. In commodities, i-sfoich require durable 
capital goods for their production, firms will differ in the durability 
and size of the capital stock. 
Secondly, the earlier analysis ignored the fact that there may 
be competition for research» The number of researchers is, itself, 
an endogenous variable, so that even if they were a single firm pre-
sently producing the commodity, there might be a number of potential 
researchers 0 
•j 
There is an analogy here to monopolistic competition which may 
pirove useful: there we are concerned with the distribution of firms across 
product space, here we are concerned with the distribution of firms across 
"research strategy space53 » 
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Firms recognize this, and their research and' production strategies 
will be directed to take this into account. A monopolist will attempt 
both to pre-empt potential, competitors and to take actions which will 
discourage them from undertaking research, i.e. lowering the return to 
their invention if he fails to pre-empt them. It is easy to show that 
if both the monopolist and other researchers have the same cost function, 
then the monopolist will always find it profitable to pre-empt his po-
tential competitors, so long as the joint returns to the two duopolists • 
are less than the profits of the monopolist (which they presumably would 
be if there were any competition between them, i.e. unless they acted 
completely collusively). This is true even if research outcomes are 
stochastic. 
Indeed, it may pay them so much to pre-empt that they obtain pa-
tents considerably before the optimal time (given their capital stock)\ 
for introducing the innovation? i.e. there are sleeping patents. • 
But for one reason or another, firms often are not able to prer- 1 
empt all potential competitors. There are a number of actions which 
they can take to discourage potential competitors. They can have 
excess capacity, so that the equilibrium price, were the competitors 
successful, would be low; in the case of natural resources they threat 
of entry leads the monopolist to increase his price, conserving on the 
use of natural resources, so that at the time of invention, the price 
to which the market falls will be low. 
In the case of R&D for the development of a substitute for a 
natural resource, a detailed comparison between the socially optimal 
allocation of resources to invention and the timing of invention and 
innovation, and that in a number of alternative market structures has 
been carried out. This has shown that in markets with competitive 
entry into research, if the stock of natural resources is low, there 
may be excessive research, but in other market structures there will 
be too little. Moreover, a monopoly engages in less research than 
does a market with competitive entry into the research sector? but 
as w® noted earlier, unrestricted entry into the research sector may 
lead current prices in the. resource monopoly to be higher» In certain 
market structures (a«g« a monopoly of the resource, competition in the 
research sector, but a patent which gives the successful researcher a 
monopoly over the substitute) the date of first innovation given that 
the invention has already occurred, may be too early. 
There is no comparable detailed investigation of other kinds of 
commodities, but the results should be directly applicable to commodities 
produced by means of durable capital goods. 
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, the market structure itself 
needs to be viewed as endogenous, a result of the research undertaken by 
different firms and their success (itself a stochastic variable). 
in this view, it is only the technology of technical change and 
demand functions, and the legal structure which should be taken as exo-
genous. This view reverses the traditional causal structures a partic-
ular industry may have a high pace of technical change not because it 
is highly concentrated? rather, it may be high concentrated because 
of the high pace of technical change which is occurring there. In fact, 
as in any simultaneous equation system, neither sentence by itself 
makes much sense. The degree of concentration, in equilibrium, is 
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just that required to generate the monopoly profits to pay for the R&D 
expenditures which/ given the degree of concentration, it is optimal for 
each firm to undertake. In this situation, there is no incentive for 
entry or exit. (There in fact may be profits associated with cost dif-
ferentials, implictly a rent on earlier obtained knowledge.) 
The policy question is not so much what would be the effect of 
more competition on the equilibrium price, as in traditional anti-trust 
discussions, but what would be the effect of a particular policy (patent 
policy, anti-trust policy, protection policy) on the rate of technical ; 
progress, the degree of concentration, and the level of prices in the 
long run. The short run and long run consequences may differ markedly. 
We shall not, however, pursue these questions further here. 
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4o Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, I have attempted to survey a number of recent develop-
ments in the economics of RSD. Adam Smith's invisible hand is not only 
not visible, but there is considerable evidence that it is not even there. 
But that does not mean that the visible hand of Government Intervention 
would improve the allocation of resources. The question is far more 
subtle than that. 
What the theories we have presented may do is provide an explana-
tion of the particular patterns of innovation and diffusion of techniques 
that have been observed, an explanation of why in certain industries 
there may be rapid innovation, in others less rapid. Moreover, our ana-
lysis may provide a rationale for certain types of intervention and an 
argument against other types of intervention. Let me briefly illustrate. 
a) We suggested earlier that knowledge that a certain innovation 
is economically viable is of considerable economic value? the 
first innovator may not be able to capture these returns. 
There are further "advantages to being late." if that is the 
case, it may be in the private interests of each firm to post-
pone innovation, waiting for someone else to "try out" this 
innovation. Such delay may be far from socially optimal. 
Auctioning off temporary monopoly rights may in this situation, 
constitute a Pareto Improvement. 
b) Models of diffusion of technological change have largely 
focused'on the lags in learning about the new technology. 
The usual logistics curve is obtained using the standard 
"epidemic" model based on contacts? in our analysis, the 
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rate of introduction is affected by the distribution of risk 
attitudes within the population and by the rate by which un-
certainty about the economic viability of the new technology 
or product is reduced as a result of its introduction by 
others. 
c) Similar considerations are involved in an analysis of the 
optimal method of adapting a technology which was originally 
designed for developed countries to the l.d.c.'s. A sequence 
of adaptations, first to environments which are similar to 
those in developed countries, and then to environments which 
are less similar, may reduce both the total cost of adaptation 
and the risk associated with the success of each stage in the 
process of adaptation. (The distributional implications of 
such a "trickle down" approach to knowledge needs to be 
investigated.) 
d) Policies which affect the amount of returns which multinationals 
can obtain in the introduction of new technologies to l.d.c.'s 
may not only reduce the flow of technology to l.d.c.'s, but may 
affect the pattern of technology development in a way which may 
be disadvantageous to the l.d.c.'s. 
These remarks are put forward as suggestions of how the basic 
theory we have developed, an information theoretic approach 
to R&D, focusing on the biases introduced by varying degrees 
of appropriability associated with varying kinds of R&D, and 
on the critical relationships between R&D and market structure 
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may enhance our understanding of the processes by which new 
technologies and products become transfered to l.d.c.'s and 
adapted there to the conditions within the countries» 
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Figure 1. Invention Possibility Schedule: Tradeoff 
Between Labor and Capital Augmenting 
Technical Progress 
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Reduction in Variable Cost 
Figure 3o Trade-of fs Between Reduction in Fixed and 
Variable Costs 
Figure 4. Localized Technical Progress 
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